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Challenges and opportunities of gender equality litigation in Nepal 
 
Mara Malagodi
*
 
 
The constitutionalization of an enforceable right to equality opens novel avenues to 
pursue gender equality claims and presents a new set of challenges for feminist 
activists. This article analyzes Nepal’s constitutional litigation for alleged breaches of 
the right to equality with respect to gender from the re-democratization of 1990 until 
the promulgation of the current constitution in September 2015. It makes one central 
argument: Nepal’s Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in advancing the rights of 
Nepali women by crafting—in an incremental way—a nuanced, contextually sensitive, 
constitutional meaning of gender equality. In this respect, gender equality 
jurisprudence has been central to the judicial construction of Nepal’s constitutional 
identity. Nepal’s extensive experience of gender equality litigation offers key 
comparative lessons—especially for deeply divided societies—on the accommodation 
of demands for social inclusion and the construction of social identities by 
constitutional means. 
 
1. Introduction 
The constitutional right to equality—in its textual, jurisprudential, and operational 
dimensions—offers unique insights into the role of law in constructing the polity’s 
collective identity and in challenging (or preserving) existing socio-economic 
hierarchies. This article focuses on Nepal’s Supreme Court–level constitutional 
litigation for alleged breaches of the right to equality with respect to gender between 
1990 and 2015. It presents one central argument: Nepal’s Supreme Court has played a 
pivotal role in advancing the rights of Nepali women by crafting—in an incremental 
way—a nuanced, contextually sensitive, constitutional meaning of gender equality. In 
this respect, gender equality jurisprudence has been central to the judicial construction 
of Nepal’s constitutional identity. The Court has contributed to the definition and re-
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definition of the collective identity of the Nepali polity by classifying which forms of 
conduct constitute unlawful gender-based discrimination, and for what reasons. This 
process of judicial “meaning-making” is articulated through the definition of the 
scope, remit, and boundaries of gender equality in a discursive fashion. In the span of 
twenty-five years, Nepal’s Supreme Court has progressively become bolder and more 
assertive in its decisions, initially deploying a more limited formal conceptualization 
of gender equality and then increasingly embracing a more substantive understanding. 
The article’s central claim, however, ought to be qualified at the outset. While 
Nepal’s Supreme Court has overall made a tremendous contribution to improving the 
status and position of Nepali women, its interventions have not been uniform, equally 
incisive, or proportionally successful. A combination of structural and cultural factors 
both inherent in constitutional litigation and specific to the Nepali context helps to 
explain the uneven impact of gender equality litigation in the country. First, issues of 
access to justice, the lack of diversity on the bench, the stifling of the rights discourse 
through formalistic interpretation and overly technical legal language, the difficulty in 
implementing judicial decisions, and the non-democratic nature of courts raise the 
question of whether the courtroom per se is the most appropriate site to advance 
gender equality claims.
1
 Second, the way in which claims are framed, understood, and 
disposed of in the courtroom is shaped by the multidimensional nature of gender 
equality claims, which straddle issues of class and identity,
2
 and are of an 
intersectional nature.
3
 In fact, gender interlocks not only with class but also with other 
identity-based forms of social differentiation. In Nepal, these are caste, ethnicity, 
language, religion, region, sexuality, age, and disability. The combination of these 
forms of “ranking systems” has created over the years a dominant social order, 
historically entrenched hierarchies, and path-dependent patterns of social exclusion 
and disempowerment.
4
 The context-specific way in which forms of oppression and 
discrimination have interlocked in Nepal over the centuries bears profound impact on 
the structures of constitutional adjudication and the behavior of the actors involved in 
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litigation. These factors are crucial to understanding the opportunities of – and 
limitations to – women’s constitutional agency in litigating the right to equality.  
The article examines gender equality litigation in Nepal’s Supreme Court from 
the re-democratization of 1990 until the promulgation of the current constitution in 
September 2015. It represents the first major doctrinal account of the right to equality 
in Nepal over twenty-five years. In this respect, post-1990 Nepal is an ideal case 
study to investigate the judicial construction of the constitutional meaning of equality 
from a multidimensional perspective. An intersectional analysis of the country’s 
extensive gender equality litigation offers crucial insights into the role of law in 
constructing, re-constructing, and potentially unhinging social hierarchies. In fact, 
Nepal is one of the poorest, most unequal, and most diverse countries in the world.
5
 
Significantly, Nepal’s democratic opening in 1990 led to a sharper politicization of 
identity and growing demands for recognition from many marginalized groups. Nepal 
has also recently endured a ten-year civil war (1996–2006) launched by the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which combined demands for equal recognition 
and redistribution. While identity and class-based political claims predate the 
“People’s War,” they were certainly radicalized by the conflict. Moreover, the civil 
war was the most systematic challenge to the monolithic state-framed construction of 
the Nepali nation. Nepali nationalism has been historically construed around the Shah 
monarchy, Hinduism, and the Nepali language—key markers of the identity of a 
country that was never colonized. Thus, the peace process (2006–2015) was informed 
by the mantra of “building a new Nepal” by delivering social inclusion through 
radical state restructuring by constitutional means.  
After 1990 the Supreme Court acquired a pivotal role in negotiating demands 
for equal treatment within Nepal’s legal domain in these crucial years. The new 1990 
constitution granted the Supreme Court extensive powers to review primary 
                                                        
5
 The 2011 Census illustrates the diverse composition of Nepal’s population with 125 caste and ethnic 
groups, of which only the largest six are above 5 percent of the total population and are not territorially 
concentrated. The two biggest groups are the Chetri, i.e. Kshatriyas of local Khas origins (16.6 
percent), and Bahun, i.e. Hill Brahmins, (12.2 percent); together they constitute the Parbatiya group, to 
which Nepal’s royal family and elites belong. About 81 percent of the population is Hindu. Nepali 
remains the lingua franca of the majority of the population, but only 44.6 percent named it as their 
mother tongue. In terms of historically marginalized groups, dalits (i.e. “former untouchables”) form 
about 14 percent of Nepal’s population. The sixty-three groups classified under the umbrella term 
“Adivasi Janajati” (i.e. indigenous people), who can be described as ethno-linguistic groups that do not 
use Nepali as their mother tongue, account for 36 percent of the total population. Madhesi groups (i.e. 
non-Pahari “Terai plain dwellers,” often erroneously described as “of Indian origins”) constitute 
slightly less than 20 percent of the total population. Available at 
http://cbs.gov.np/image/data/Population/Major%20Highlights/Major-Finding.pdf. 
 4 
legislation and entertain public interest litigation (PIL), transforming the Court into a 
key constitutional player. As a result, a staggering amount of cases investing the 
constitutional right to equality have come before Nepal’s apex court since the early 
1990s.
6
 The adjudication of gender equality claims at Supreme Court level offers key 
insight into the judicial construction of the category of women and their place in 
society through court proceedings. While gender identity is “transversal” to the 
narratives that inform Nepali nationalism, the definition of gender equality in legal 
terms through litigation bears profound implications for the constitutional 
construction of the collective identity of the Nepali polity. Gender equality litigation 
provides an interesting site to investigate patterns of marginalization in the country. 
The focus on gender brings into sharper focus the intersectional dimension of equality 
claims alongside the interplay of the politics of recognition and the politics of 
redistribution in their adjudication. Thus, Nepal’s extensive experience of gender 
equality litigation imparts key comparative lessons—especially for deeply divided 
societies—on the accommodation of demands for social inclusion on the basis of 
gender equality and the construction of social identities by constitutional means. 
 
2. Framing and litigating equality in Nepal 
While the notion of political equality has shaped modern constitutional democracy 
since its origins,
7
 it is only since the mid-twentieth century that equality as an 
enforceable right has gained traction and acquired a pivotal role in constitutional 
praxis.
8
 In Nepal this feature became central to post-1990 constitutional 
arrangements. Thus, litigation pertaining to the constitutional right to equality ought 
to be framed in the broader context of the foundational and structuring functions of 
the constitution. This section analyzes the relationship of the right to equality to the 
constitutionalization of Nepal’s national identity, then focuses on the position and 
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powers of the Supreme Court in interpreting and enforcing fundamental rights since 
1990.  
 
2.1. Constitutional nationalism and gender equality 
The textual dimension of the constitution is the starting point to inquire about the 
legal articulation of the notion of “We, the People” and its relation to constitutional 
equality. In fact, “by expressing the common identity and norms of the nation, 
constitutions serve as the state’s charter of identity.” 9  In this respect, the 1990 
constitution institutionalized a monolithic version of the Nepali nation centered on the 
dominant Parbatiya upper-caste Hindu males by subsuming the country’s many 
ethno-linguistic, caste, religious, and regional groups into a hierarchically structured 
collective identity under the banner of “unity in diversity” and restricting women’s 
rights to transmit citizenship.
10
 The post-conflict 2007 interim constitution, instead, 
diluted these forms of constitutional nationalism and adopted a more inclusive 
approach to sociocultural diversity by declaring Nepal a secular state, remaining silent 
on the Shah monarchy and on citizenship, and curtailing the privileged status of the 
Nepali language.
11
 Significantly, women had no representation at all in the drafting of 
the 1990 Constitution, and acquired very limited representation in the making of the 
2007 document after several bouts of protests.
12
 
The importance of forms of constitutional nationalism becomes apparent when 
adopting an intersectional approach to gender equality litigation, which requires a 
further distinction to be applied to the bearers of equality claims. Tarunabh Khaitan 
has introduced the helpful categorization of social groups into “potentially national 
groups”—those with expressive salience, i.e. with the potential of exclusively 
constituting a nation, such as ethno-linguistic and regional groups, etc.—and “non-
national groups”—those without expressive salience, such as women, LGBTI 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex), caste groups, dalits, etc.
 13
 This 
distinction between different types of disadvantaged groups helps to explain the 
success, or lack thereof, of their anti-discrimination claims. Applied to the Nepali 
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context, an example of this distinction would be between equality claims made, on the 
one hand, by women and, on the other hand, by Adivasi Janajati groups or Madhesi. 
This raises the question of whether the claims of Nepali women belonging to 
potentially national groups are treated differently in litigation by virtue of their 
intersectional nature and potential threat not just to the existing social order but also 
to the nation.
14
 Women—as structurally subordinated to men—are pivotal to the 
construction of the nation through their role in the biological reproduction of the 
community, appropriate forms of behavior that protect the boundaries of the nation, 
the transmission of the nation’s cultural values, the embodiment of the nation, and (to 
a lesser extent) participation in military struggles.
15
 
In this respect gender-based and ethnic, linguistic, and racial narratives are 
central to the process of nation-building, in which the constitutional arena is also 
fundamentally implicated. Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marín astutely conclude 
that “constitutional rights espouse, and are expected to espouse, the fundamental 
values of a nation and this has both good and bad consequences for women because 
courts are prepared not only to uphold but also to limit women’s claims in the name 
of those fundamental values.”16 Thus, in Nepal, the essence of equality litigation—
even in gender-based discrimination cases—has been the definition of a collective we 
alongside the relationship between different groups and their relationship to the state. 
When the Supreme Court adjudicates on equality claims, it draws the line between 
lawful and unlawful forms of inequality. By deciding which inequalities society can 
tolerate while rejecting others, the Court also justifies the basis of their acceptability 
or rejection. Through equality jurisprudence, the Supreme Court effectively defines 
and re-defines the hierarchy of belonging to the Nepali political community in the 
constitutional domain. Given the position of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the 
constitution and its prominence in the public sphere, the creation of a juridical 
classificatory discourse on equality and inequality has great legal and political 
implications for society at large well beyond the doors of the courtroom.  
The definition of the right to equality in both documents has been inextricably 
intertwined with the framing of the nation. In fact, the 1990 Constitution favored a 
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negative view of equality based on the principle of non-discrimination. Under the 
right to equality (article 11) cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious affiliations did 
not provide any basis to positive legal entitlements but were treated solely as possible 
causes for negative discrimination. The proviso also allowed for future enactments of 
special legislation for the advancement of the unprivileged segments of Nepali 
society. However, forms of affirmative action, as defined by the legislator, were not 
based on membership in a group whose identity was defined in ethno-linguistic or 
religious terms (i.e. potentially national groups) but restricted to categories of “non-
national groups” and class groups defined by their lack of resources similar to the 
category of “other backward classes” in the Indian Constitution. Additionally, the 
1990 Constitution preserved Nepal’s tradition of legal uniformity, with no personal 
law system as in India. With the growing emphasis on social inclusion at the 
beginning of the peace process, the 2007 interim constitution took a further step 
toward the recognition of the rights of potentially national groups on the basis of 
sociocultural criteria such as ethno-linguistic and regional identity (article 13). 
Similarly to the 1990 document, the interim constitution left measures of positive 
discrimination in the hands of the legislator, but expanded and further defined the 
categories of those potentially entitled to such measures to include Adivasi Janajati 
and Madhesi. 
 
2.2. Constitutional rights and the Supreme Court 
The re-democratization of 1990 also entailed a significant shift toward the legal 
protection of rights in Nepal. From a domestic perspective, the new constitution 
contained an extensive fundamental rights section and mechanisms for judicial review 
of legislation and the enforcement of rights. From an international perspective, in the 
early 1990s Nepal ratified an array of international human rights instruments, which 
became enforceable domestically. The promulgation of the 1990 Constitution also 
brought substantial changes in the position and organization of the Nepali judiciary, 
expanding the powers and remit of the courts—particularly the Supreme Court.17 The 
new constitution directly linked judicial independence to the protection of democratic 
constitutionalism (article 84). Moreover, the Supreme Court became the only 
institution authorized to provide the final and binding interpretation of the 
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constitution. This was reflected in the Court’s extensive powers to review the 
constitutionality of primary legislation and void it under article 88(1). In Nepal, the 
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review explicitly featured in the constitution, 
emulating the developments in independent India.  
Thus, the 1990 Constitution departed from the Westminster model by formally 
establishing limits on parliamentary sovereignty and institutionalizing “strong-form 
institutions of judicial review.”18  In fact, article 23 on the right to constitutional 
remedy directly linked the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights to 
judicial intervention. It is also through the understanding of the concomitants, 
successes, and popularity of PIL in India that it is possible to evaluate the scope and 
goal of Nepal’s constitution-makers in 1990 in empowering the Supreme Court to 
issue prerogative writs and employ the mechanism of PIL under article 88(2). The 
relaxation of the rule of lucus standi led to a great number of litigants approaching the 
Court. Thus, the Supreme Court sought to streamline PIL petitions and identified the 
following key principles: the dispute has to be based on existing laws and not be 
hypothetical; the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable connection with and a 
substantial interest in the dispute; and all other remedies must have been exhausted.
19
 
The Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review and PIL under the 2007 
Constitution’s articles 107(1) and 107(2) remained virtually unchanged and allowed 
the Court to strengthen its position. The Court became progressively bolder and more 
assertive in its decisions. At the same time, the number of PIL petitions continued to 
increase and in December 2012 the Supreme Court sought to restrict access to the 
Court.
20
 The reforms have been criticized and deemed excessive as they now 
represent outright barriers of access (e.g. the mandatory requirement of legal 
representation).
21
  
Effectively, post-1990 constitutional litigation often combined PIL and 
judicial review proceedings. For instance, a great deal of gender equality litigation has 
been conducted in the form of PIL and abstract review of primary or secondary 
legislation. In other words, many of these cases did not feature aggrieved individuals 
seeking redress for a concrete human rights violation they had suffered but activist 
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lawyers petitioning the Court in the name of public interest to have a specific law or 
part thereof declared void as breaching the constitutional right to equality. In a sense, 
the real defendants in these cases have been specific statutory provisions, while 
various government bodies as the respondent were tasked with defending the legal 
status quo. Therefore, the degree of the Supreme Court’s intervention ought to be 
measured not just by the contingent remedy provided but also by its vigor in engaging 
the other branches of government in the course of the litigation. 
Significantly, Nepal’s Supreme Court has consistently lacked in diversity both 
in terms of gender and other socially marginalized groups. In 2013 the National 
Judicial Academy reported that the Supreme Court’s composition as of December 
2012 featured fourteen judges in total, with only one female judge. Almost 86 percent 
of the Justices were Bahun/Chetri, including the only female judge. Dalits and 
Muslims were not represented at all, while only one Madhesi and one Janajati (a 
Newar, one of the few groups even more over-represented than Bahun/Chetri) judge 
featured.
22
 In this respect, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report 
from 2017 concluded that the lack of diversity across Nepal’s judiciary has negatively 
affected the legitimacy and public perceptions of the judicial system, and also the 
ability of the bench to empathize with vulnerable groups.
23
 Thus, the composition of 
the Supreme Court—dominated by the hegemonic groups—ought to be factored in 
when explaining patterns of judicial decision-making in gender equality litigation. 
 
3. Constitutional equality and gender in Nepal: doctrine and praxis 
The analysis of Nepal’s long string of Supreme Court-level gender equality cases 
between 1990 and 2015 from an intersectional perspective illuminates the broader 
constitutional meaning of the right to equality and its operationalization. This article 
contends that the analysis of Nepal’s gender equality jurisprudence reveals how the 
Supreme Court has by and large advanced the rights of Nepali women by discursively 
construing the category of women as an object of equality in constitutional terms. To 
do so, the study analyzes key cases on the economic position of women within the 
family and in the workplace; the place of women within the family structure and their 
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bodily autonomy; gender-based violence; and women’s ability to pass on residency 
and citizenship rights. What emerges from this critical overview of the key case law is 
a nuanced picture of the constitutional meaning of gender equality. The judicially 
construed classification of conduct as discriminatory or non-discriminatory has 
become a core element of Nepal’s constitutional identity negotiated between 
traditional autochthonous values and modern global norms.   
 
3.1. The economic position of women: property rights, tax, and employment law  
Gender equality litigation in Nepal started with demands for ending gender-based 
discrimination in financial matters. These claims sought to redress injustices of both 
misdistribution and misrecognition. Petitioners in this line of cases have consistently 
been activist lawyers working through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
their litigation strategy combined PIL with judicial review proceedings. Their ultimate 
goal was to use constitutional litigation to change the law. As such, most cases have 
been abstract challenges to the validity of different pieces of legislation violating the 
constitutional right to equality, often alongside other constitutional rights and 
international obligations. The key factor determining the outcome of this batch of 
cases has been whether discrimination against women was taking place within or 
outside the family. This “positionality” has determined how the Court conceptualized 
and treated Nepali women. When litigation has engaged the position of women within 
the family, the Court has effectively treated them as a valuable and indispensable part 
of the larger familial unit but has not challenged their structurally subordinate 
position. As such the Court consistently held that women are entitled to fair treatment 
within the family and a modicum of redistribution to correct unfairness. But it stopped 
short of recognizing their autonomy and unhinging those traditional roles.  
The Supreme Court has not addressed gender-based injustices of 
misrecognition because it has assumed that women’s identities and economic 
entitlements are defined by their gender roles within the family. These ascribed 
feminine “reproductive” roles have long structured the allocation of resources within 
the family in which women are by definition subordinate to men. The Supreme Court 
has not challenged this hierarchical ordering but took it at face value. However, when 
litigation has engaged the position of women in the labor market outside the family, 
the Supreme Court has been vocal and uncompromisingly progressive in construing 
 11 
women as independent individuals making their financial way into the modern world. 
Thus, the Court has condemned gender discrimination as an outdated form of 
economic inefficiency to be eradicated by legal means, and Nepal’s judicial 
construction of gender equality in the economic sphere has been informed primarily 
by traditional gender roles within the family, and prima facie, not by intersectional 
considerations. However, it is clear that this line of litigation has been primarily 
dictated by the preoccupations of upper class and middle class women from the 
dominant groups who have higher stakes in redistributive reforms of property law.  
 
(a) Property and inheritance law 
The first important Supreme Court decision on property rights is the famous Mira 
Dhungana (2052) case, in which activist lawyers challenged the validity of section 16 
of the Muluki Ain’s chapter 13 on inheritance for daughters. 24  The Court 
acknowledged that the Code treated sons and daughters differently but argued that 
women were also entitled to a share of their husband’s property, hence agreeing with 
the respondent’s view that in Nepali society women have two different kinds of 
status: daughters living in their fathers’ houses before marriage, and wives living in 
their husbands’ houses after marriage. The Supreme Court relied on the advice of the 
amicus curiae, who had argued that the case had raised the problematic question of 
Nepal’s social structure and, implicitly, of the relationship between law and society in 
the Nepali context. The amicus suggested that the complex issue of gender equality 
ought to be dealt with by parliament in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion.  
The Supreme Court did not exercise its power of judicial review to strike 
down the impugned provision. The bench issued a mandamus to the government to 
introduce an appropriate bill in parliament in consultation with the various competent 
organizations. The Court also recognized the “patriarchal bias” of Nepali society, but 
it did not declare the provision ultra vires on the basis that “making sudden changes 
in traditional social customs and social norms which society has followed since long 
time society might be unable to adjust to these changes.” The Court did not challenge 
the ideological foundations of these discriminatory practices and did not address the 
substantive meaning of equality under the constitution. Justice Laxman Aryal argued 
that—rather than the outcome of the litigation per se—in primis the significance of 
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the case resided in the fact that the Court had entertained the petition, hence opening 
the courtroom’s doors to activist litigation and engaged the government by directing it 
to introduce legal reform in this area. 
 The Supreme Court adopted the same approach in the Sapana Pradhan Malla 
(2053) case, a PIL challenging the constitutional validity of section 26(1) of Land Act 
1964 concerning daughters’ tenancy rights.25 The Court again did not exercise its 
power of judicial review and ordered the government to introduce an appropriate bill 
in parliament after consultations. The different position of daughters in the matter of 
tenancy rights was explained in relation to traditional social practices, “because a 
daughter after contracting her marriage is expected to go to the other house [i.e. the 
marital home] and become part of the other family according to the usual social 
values and rituals.” The Court employed the South Asian notion of kanyādān (“giving 
away the bride”) to justify the exclusion of daughters from tenancy rights. It was 
argued that the provision had been devised to guarantee the continuity of possession 
of the land within the tenant’s family, ultimately to encourage agricultural production. 
Again the Supreme Court, while recommending an overhaul of this area of law, 
justified the rationale of gender discrimination in the existing legal regime.  
In the Canda Bajracharya case, activist lawyers filed a PIL seeking the 
constitutional review of a number of Muluki Ain’s provisions discriminating against 
women on the basis of the right to equality and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
26
 Yet again the Supreme 
Court deferred to the legislature and did not invalidate the impugned legislation but 
explained the existing legal framework in light of Nepal’s social and religious 
traditions. For the first time in cases pertaining to the right to equality, the Court 
directly connected the reference to Nepal’s traditional social structure to the 
constitutional definition of Nepal as a “Hindu kingdom” in article 4(1) and the 
peculiar connotation of religion in article 19. The Court recognized that these 
provisions treat men and women differently but then argued that it is nearly 
impossible to realize absolute equality. The judges also held that family and social 
customs are inextricably intertwined like various provisions of Nepal’s legal system, 
which is based on Hindu law. Thus, it would be unwise to strike down provisions in 
an erratic fashion and a systematic process of legal reform carried out by parliament 
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would be preferable. Ultimately, the Supreme Court interpreted Nepal’s social 
practices and traditions as reflected in the law to be quintessentially Hindu—just like 
the nation. 
Notwithstanding the mixed experiences of activist lawyers in petitioning the 
Court via constitutional litigation, these early cases played a crucial role in 
transforming the Supreme Court into a key public forum in which women’s rights 
were debated, interpreted and ultimately defined in their scope and remit. Moreover, 
even if the Court did not often grant a remedy, it exercised pressure on the 
government to introduce reforms designed to achieve greater gender justice. Thus, the 
Muluki Ain (11th Amendment) Act was eventually passed in 2002 and took important 
steps toward gender equality.
27
 Activist lawyers were encouraged by the legislative 
developments and petitioned the Court further by combining abstract review of 
legislation with PIL. In the post-2002 case law on women’s property rights, the 
Supreme Court became progressively bolder, tested the effectiveness of the 11th 
Amendment, and started to invalidate legislation.  
The Mira Dhungana (2061) case challenged the validity of section 12A of the 
Muluki Ain’s chapter 13 on inheritance introduced by the 11th Amendment forcing 
daughters to return their share of the inherited property after marriage.
28
 The Court 
struck down the impugned provision and directed the government to set up a 
commission to study and reform the laws discriminating on the basis of gender. 
Similarly, in the Sapana Pradhan Malla (2061) case the validity of section 2 of the 
Muluki Ain’s chapter 13 on inheritance discriminating between women on the basis of 
marital status was challenged.
29
 The Court directed the government to set up a 
commission to study this area of law and then to amend the existing framework 
accordingly. Along those lines, the Prakash Mani Sharma (2062) case challenged the 
validity of sections 1A and 16 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter 13 on inheritance requiring 
daughters to return their share of the ancestral property after marriage.
30
 The Supreme 
Court did not invalidate the impugned provision but held that it violated the 
constitutional right to equality, a number of international legal instruments, and the 
spirit of the Muluki Ain’s 11th Amendment, which was to secure equal inheritance 
rights for daughters. As a result, the Court directed the government to consult with 
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civil society actors in order to assess the impact of the amendment and introduce 
further changes to the Code to eliminate gender-based discrimination in this area.  
In another landmark decision, the Lily Thapa (2062) case, activists challenged 
the validity of section 2 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter on women’s exclusive property, 
constraining the rights of women to dispose of their immovable property 
independently.
31
 The Supreme Court held that the impugned provision imposed an 
unreasonable restriction on women and declared it to be ultra vires because it was 
discriminatory. The same reasoning was adopted in the Mira Dhungana (2063a) case, 
which successfully challenged the validity of section 7 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter on 
women’s exclusive property, restricting women’s ability to transfer their property on 
the basis of their marital status.
32
  
The shift in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward women’s equal property 
rights claims was accompanied by a change in the authorities supporting the 
decisions. The post-2002 case law features extensive references to Nepal’s 
international law obligations to explain the Court’s more interventionist stance and a 
move away from discriminatory traditions and customs. The Supreme Court also 
continued to focus on its dialogue with the government and the legislature. In fact, 
after the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007 and the passing of the 
Gender Equality Act 2006, more cases on women’s property rights reached the 
Supreme Court, and confirmed the post-2002 position.
33
 However, it is crucial to 
highlight that while the Supreme Court sought to achieve greater fairness in the 
distribution of material resources between men and women within the family, it did 
not challenge the gender-based male–female distinction that justifies gender-based 
discrimination in Nepal’s property law. This is reflected in the fact that, according to 
the 2011 Census, only in 19.71 percent of Nepal’s households do women enjoy 
ownership over land and property.
34
 According to the earlier 2001 Census, less than 1 
percent of the total households reported female ownership of the main three types of 
economic assets (house, land, and livestock). Significantly, this was the case across 
all of Nepal’s social groups, condemning women across Nepali society to face greater 
economic insecurity than men “since their access to what has traditionally been the 
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primary means of production has always been indirect and dependent on their relation 
as the daughter, wife or mother of a land owning male.”35 
 
(b) Tax law, employment law, and quotas 
The second batch of cases on the economic position of women concerns the legal 
treatment of women with regard to their work outside the family. In this respect, it is 
interesting to compare two gender equality cases in which women petitioned the 
Supreme Court to secure equal economic treatment to those of men. In Sarala Rani 
Rauniyar the petitioner unsuccessfully asked the Court to declare ultra vires section 
21(a) of the Income Tax Act 1974, which required that a wife’s income be assessed 
on her husband’s name, on the grounds that it violated the right to equality.36 The 
Court held that equality is not absolute and laws are discriminatory only when they 
provide unreasonable classifications between men and women. For instance, in this 
case, the Court argued that the law does not mandate a lower tax rate for husbands’ 
income than for wives.  
The Supreme Court, however, adopted a completely different approach in the 
case of Rina Bajracariya, a petition regarding discrimination on the basis of gender in 
the retirement age of the employees of the Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation 
(RNAC).
37
 The Court exercised its power of judicial review and struck down rule 
16(1)(3) of the RNAC Service Regulations. It was held that the provision violated the 
right to equality and adopted a completely different reasoning to justify its decision. 
The difference in the outcome of these cases is best explained by looking at their 
context and the justification offered by the Court. In Rina Bajracariya, the judges 
held that men and women are both human beings and as such are entitled to 
fundamental rights in an equal manner. Interestingly, the Court differentiated between 
the countries that adopt the principle of gender equality as civilized and humane and 
those that reject it as uncivilized and underdeveloped. The judges also explicitly 
associated the freedom of women with modern civilization and the dawn of 
democracy.  
This enormous shift in the justification of gender equality offered by the 
Supreme Court is significant because the judicial message is unequivocal: women 
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who have entered the marketplace as individuals ought to be treated as equal to men. 
Here the judges espouse the modern capitalist logic of meritocracy in which 
discrimination is treated as an economic inefficiency to be corrected. The deployment 
of a globalized equality language also frames gender equality in the context of 
international human rights and comparative constitutional experiences. As such, the 
Court identified the 1990 return to democracy and the promulgation of the 
constitution as crucial in the legal recognition of gender equality in Nepal because the 
document had been drafted in light of the experiences of the constitutional systems of 
other democratic countries and the universalization of human rights. The Court 
argued that it was in the spirit of the 1990 constitution to end all forms of 
discrimination against women. It also criticized parliament for not acting sufficiently 
fast in introducing legislative reforms on gender justice and giving form to the spirit 
of the constitution. The Supreme Court also went as far as arguing that the greatest 
impediment to end discrimination between men and women are the existing culture 
and laws. The comparison between these two cases reveals that the Court was 
prepared to recognize gender equality in the workplace but not women’s financial 
autonomy within the patriarchal structure of the family. 
In this respect, Nepal’s Supreme Court succeeded in promoting a more equal 
playing field for women in the work place outside of the family by combining a strict 
approach to non-discrimination with a modicum of redistributive measures. This 
approach was also deployed in affirmative action cases on quotas and women’s access 
to public employment. In an early case on quotas, Pradhosh Chetri, the Supreme 
Court adjudicated on the issue of reservations for the enrollment in academic 
institutions of women and other marginalized groups.
38
 The Court directed the 
government to enact legislation to uplift the weakest segments of society pursuant to 
the right to equality. To support the advancement of women in the public sector, in 
Pro-Public (2062) the Supreme Court ordered the government to streamline the 
length of the probation period for female civil service employees.
39
 Similarly, in the 
Mira Dhungana (2064) case, the Supreme Court struck down rule 10 of the Royal 
Nepal Army rules providing for the allowance to daughters of service men to be 
discontinued after their marriage as violating the right to equality.
40
 On the same 
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basis, in the Sapana Pradhan Malla (2066) case, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
provision of the Military and Police Regulations prescribing that women—unlike 
men—had to be unmarried to join the force.41 The Supreme Court has declared in an 
unequivocal and consistent manner that once women step out of the family and into 
the labor market the constitutional right to equality mandates non-discrimination on 
the basis of gender and equal economic treatment between men and women. 
 
3.2. Women in the family: marriage, divorce, dowry, and reproductive rights  
Nepal’s Supreme Court has interpreted gender equality within the familial 
relationship in a similar fashion to the case law on the economic position of women. 
Prima facie intersectional considerations had almost no role in the judgments. 
However, a more careful analysis reveals that many of these areas of law have been 
influenced by the legal culture of dominant Parbatiya groups. As a result, the Court 
has not challenged traditional gender roles but interpreted equality of treatment to 
mean fairness of treatment and extended judicial protection to women, who remain in 
a structurally weaker position. This has often resulted in a removal of discriminatory 
rules, but without challenging traditional gender roles in matters of marriage, divorce, 
and dowry. Instead, the area in which the Nepali Supreme Court has made enormous 
strides is that of reproductive rights. Starting from the need to protect women’s well-
being, the Court went on to affirm women’s autonomy and their right of controlling 
their own bodies as independent individuals. The Court masterfully crafted a 
judicially sanctioned form of empowerment under the guise of protection.  
 
(a) Family law 
Immediately after the 11th Amendment of the Muluki Ain was passed, a string of PIL 
cases seeking review of various family law provisions conflicting with the 
constitutional right to equality ensued. Overall the Supreme Court responded 
positively to these actions and sought to ensure women were treated fairly within the 
family by removing discriminatory barriers. In the Chandra Kanta Gyawali (2061) 
case, the petitioner challenged the validity of section 9 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter on 
marriage prescribing a different legal treatment for men and women in cases of 
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bigamy.
42
 The Supreme Court declared the provision ultra vires as conflicting with 
the constitutional right to equality. On a similar note, the Mira Dhungana (2063b) 
case was a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 1 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter 
on marriage allowing the husband to obtain a dissolution of marriage on the basis of 
the wife’s infertility but not vice versa.43 The Court declared the provision ultra vires 
on the basis that it violates the right to equality and international human rights 
standards; it also ordered the government to introduce the appropriate amendments to 
the existing legislation.  
In the Sapana Pradhan Malla (2063) case, the petitioner asked the Supreme 
Court to strike down the provision of the Marriage Registration Act that differentiates 
between men and women with regard to their marital age, 22 and 18, respectively, and 
conflicted with the Muluki Ain.
44
 On the basis of the petitioner’s argument as 
supported by a United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
report that the existing legal position violated the right to equality and facilitated child 
marriages, the Court held that the provision breached the right to equality, but it did 
not exercise its power of judicial review and ordered the government to amend the 
provision accordingly. A similar approach was adopted in post-2007 gender equality 
litigation on in family law matters. In the Sapana Malla (2063) case the Supreme 
Court reviewed section 9 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter on marriage allowing husbands 
to remarry when the wife is affected by an incurable venereal disease or serious 
mental disability. It found the provision to be discriminatory, but did not strike it 
down. Instead, the bench ordered the government to bring this piece of legislation in 
line with the interim constitution.
45
 While the Supreme Court consistently ruled in 
favor of gender equality, it never recommended to the legislator the adoption of 
gender-neutral language in family law matters. This illustrates that the strides made 
by the Court on these issues have remained limited to securing a fair treatment of 
women within the traditional familial structures but did not extend to challenging 
those roles. 
 
(b) Dowry 
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The constitutional litigation on dowry offers invaluable insights into gender-based 
discrimination and its costs, in terms of both material distribution of resources and 
potential violence against women. The payment of dowry to the groom’s side can be 
viewed as a price that the bride’s family pays to secure their daughter’s place in 
society through a suitable matrimonial arrangement and as a sort of insurance for the 
bride’s future. The system of dowry is ultimately underpinned by the idea that women 
have a lower and more precarious status within society and within the family. As such 
the endowment of dowry reflects a gender-based structural social imbalance, 
requiring extra “material support” for women—an insurance premium the bride’s 
family has to pay to secure the bride’s future and almost a form of compensation to 
the groom’s family for taking in the bride. Thus, it is impossible to develop a gender-
neutral response to regulate the giving and taking of dowry—and its criminalization. 
The Court condemned the practice as a social evil—as do all the other South Asian 
courts – but in justifying its decision it never addressed the root causes of the 
problem, i.e. the cultural taboo of the unmarried woman, and the social imperative of 
securing an appropriate matrimonial match. 
In this line of cases, given the complexity of the issue, the Supreme Court in 
primis sought to retain a dialogue with the other branches of government, while also 
taking an activist stance. In the Mira Dhungana (2063c) case, the petitioner 
succeeded in persuading the Supreme Court to declare ultra vires the provisions of the 
Social Behavior and Reform Act 1976 discriminating between the bride’s side and the 
groom’s side in the punishment for giving and demanding dowry.46 The Court ruled 
that the provision violated the right to equality and issued a directive order to the 
government to amend the relevant legislation. Similarly, in the case of Ram Pant 
Kharel (2063), the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner’s request to declare ultra 
vires section 5 of the Social Behavior and Reform Act 1976 on the basis that the 
ground was not made out, but issued an order to the government to implement the 
letter and spirit of this piece of legislation with a view of eradicating the social evil of 
dowry.
47
 In the landmark case of Jyoti Lamsan Poudel, the Court ordered the 
government to introduce legislative reforms on dowry regulation, enhance the 
punishment for dowry-related offences, and ensure implementation both to deter and 
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to eradicate the practice.
48
 The Supreme Court’s approach to dowry reflects the more 
general attitude of the Nepali state, which continues to increase the criminal penalties 
for dowry but does little to empower women as individuals regardless of their position 
within the family. As a result, the practice of dowry and the harm it causes remain 
widespread.
49
 
 
(c) Reproductive rights 
With regard to women’s bodily independence and control over their reproductive 
rights, the Supreme Court has taken a consistent stance in prioritizing the protection 
of women through an expansive interpretation of the constitutional right to equality. It 
was only in 2002 with the Muluki Ain’s 11th Amendment that Nepal’s abortion laws 
were substantively liberalized. In the early case of Sapana Pradhan Malla (2062), the 
Supreme Court tested the legislative reforms and directed the government to amend 
the provisions on sentencing for abortion-related crimes that distinguished between 
pregnant women and facilitators.
50
 Conversely, in the case of Achyut Kharel (2065), 
the petitioner sought to claim that Nepal’s abortion laws discriminate against Nepali 
men because the husband’s consent to the procedure is not required.51 The Court 
dismissed the petition and the following year the new interim constitution specifically 
recognized women’s reproductive rights as part of the constitutionally protected and 
justiciable fundamental rights.  
Under the guise of the right to equality the Supreme Court protected women’s 
reproductive rights and health in the Prakash Mani Sharma (2065) case whereby the 
Court issued an order of mandamus to the government to secure medical treatment for 
women affected by uterus prolapse.
52
 Similarly, the Supreme Court ordered the 
government to protect the reproductive rights of female prisoners.
53
 Finally, the 
Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment in the case of Laxmi Devi Dhikta, in 
which abortion rights were deemed to be integral to the right against discrimination 
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and the right to equality.
54
 With regard to the implementation of these landmark 
judgments, the accessibility and affordability of abortion services, especially in 
remote areas, remains problematic. 
 
3.3. Violence against women and harmful practices 
Another batch of gender equality cases combined judicial review and PIL to eradicate 
pernicious customs and violent behavior against women. These were purely identity-
based non-discrimination cases filed on the basis of a negative understanding of the 
constitutional right to equality. The Supreme Court consistently sought to affirm the 
principle of equality interpreted in this context as a means of protecting the weakest 
segments of society and banning socially repugnant behavior. In this line of cases, the 
Supreme Court continued to address indirectly the question of what kind of polity 
Nepal aspires to be by determining which forms of conduct toward women (or certain 
categories of women) are acceptable, and which ones are not. The outcome of these 
cases, and in particular the justification offered by the Court, are pivotal to 
understanding the role of gender in the judicial construction of Nepal’s constitutional 
identity. This is because the treatment of women has long been regarded as a key 
indicator of the civilizational level of a nation in the modern era.  
 
(a) Superstitious practices 
The Supreme Court became an institutional vehicle to combat traditional superstitious 
practices harmful to women. In Reshma Thapa, the Court ordered the government to 
introduce legislation to eradicate and deter conduct that victimizes women on the 
basis of witchcraft.
55
 In the Dil Bahadur Bishwakarma case, the petitioner filed a PIL 
and obtained a declaration by the Supreme Court that the practice of chaupadi 
breaches women’s rights and violates the right to equality as well as an order of 
mandamus directed at various government departments to stop the practice.
56
 Under 
this practice, women after childbirth and during menstruation are considered ritually 
polluting and are therefore forced by family members to leave the family home and 
live in a cowshed or hut, exposing them to a severe risk of sexual violence and attacks 
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by animals. This practice is prevalent in Nepal among upper caste Hindu groups and 
dalits in the rural areas. In such cases the Court unequivocally condemned the 
practices and justified its decisions on the basis of the modern language of 
enlightenment and rights. Tradition is condemned as superstition that ought to be 
erased from modern Nepal by means of criminalization and developmental 
interventions by the state. These practices continue unabated, especially in more 
remote areas. 
 
(b) Widowhood 
Widows in Nepal suffer from widespread discrimination as a result of a certain line of 
interpretation in Hinduism. The Supreme Court has significantly changed its stance 
on this matter since the early case of Tara Paudel.
 57
 The petitioner, the widow of an 
Army employee, had married the younger brother of the deceased husband to 
continue receiving the family pension under the Army Pension Regulation Act 1961. 
By way of judicial review, she challenged the legal basis of a lawsuit of incest filed 
by another coparcener in the husband’s family against her at District Court level. The 
petitioner sought an order from the Supreme Court declaring section 4 of the Muluki 
Ain’s chapter 15 on incest unconstitutional as in violation of the right to equality. The 
Court dismissed the petition arguing that the gender-based distinction between a 
widower and a widow results from the fact that they do not have an equal position in 
society due to social, religious, and traditional beliefs and practices. The Supreme 
Court interpreted the right to equality as “equal application of the law and equal 
protection of the law among equals—it does not mean the equal application of the law 
and the equal protection of the law among non-equals.” The different treatment under 
Nepali law between men and women who lost their spouse was again justified in 
terms of traditional social and religious values.  
Later on, in the case of Kavita Pandey, the Court took a more progressive and 
reformist stance against the victimization of widows and invalidated the rule that 
granted different amounts for widows’ state pensions on the basis of their age.58 In the 
Pro-Public (2069) case, the Supreme Court went even further: while condemning the 
hardship and prejudice that widows face in Nepal, it also recognized the material 
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impact of discrimination and ordered the government to provide a monetary 
allowance to widows from the date of their husband’s death.59 The Court went further 
than simply condemning this gender-based discriminatory practice and sought to 
rectify the harm it causes through redistributive measures. However, the Court did 
little in terms of justification of its decision to challenge the root causes of the 
practice.  
 
(c) Sexual violence 
Nepal’s Supreme Court adopted an activist stance in cases concerning sexual 
violence. In Mira Dhungana (2063c), the Court adjudicated on the issue of marital 
rape through the lenses of the right to equality.
60
 The petitioner sought an order from 
the Court declaring section 1 of chapter 14 on rape in the Muluki Ain unconstitutional 
as in breach of the constitutional right to equality and various international human 
rights instruments because the definition of the offense excluded “wife” from the 
categories of women listed as potential victims. The Court issued an order of 
mandamus to the government to introduce appropriate legislation to include the 
offense of marital rape, and declared marital rape a punishable criminal offense. The 
judicial reasoning in the case is significant. The government lawyers had argued that 
“according to our Hindu traditions and values, a husband having sexual intercourse 
with his wife can never be considered rape.” The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument and held that “the Dharmaśāstra cannot condone marital rape because the 
true scope of religion is to promote love.” The Court further refined the meaning of 
equality and argued that all women, by virtue of being human beings, are entitled to 
the enjoyment of fundamental rights and protection from harm irrespective of their 
marital status.  
Post-2007, the Supreme Court’s position on marital rape was reasserted in Jit 
Kumari Pangeni—a rare instance in which the petitioner was directly affected by the 
legal issues in the case.
61
 The Court held that the statutory provisions differentiating 
the length of custodial sentences for the offenses of marital and non-marital rape 
violated the constitutional right to equality and ordered the government to streamline 
them. Adopting the same reasoning that the status of the woman is irrelevant to the 
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offense of rape, in the case of Sapana Pradhan Malla (2059), the Supreme Court 
declared ultra vires part of section 7 of the Muluki Ain’s chapter on rape 
discriminating against prostitutes.
62
 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that 
all women are equally entitled to protection from sexual violence, regardless of their 
role within the family or position within society. 
 
(d) Gender-based violence 
Along similar lines, the Supreme Court has consistently sought to protect women 
from gender-based violence through an expansive interpretation of the right to 
equality and to retain a form of dialogue with the other branches in order to develop 
suitable legislative reforms. In the case of Jyoti Paudel, the Supreme Court issued an 
order of mandamus to the government to establish a fast-track court presided by 
female judges to hear cases on violence against women, especially domestic violence, 
and make arrangements to safeguard the privacy of the victims.
63
 The Court reviewed 
section 7 of the Domestic Violence (Offence and Punishment) Act 2008 in light of the 
right to equality and justified the necessity of special procedural measures in cases of 
gender-based violence. In this respect, the Supreme Court’s efforts in protecting 
women went as far as issuing an order of mandamus to the Ministry of Information 
and Communication to implement a gender-friendly advertising policy in the Raju 
Chapagai case.
 64
 The order was in response to the petitioner’s argument that violence 
against women has an intimate relationship with advertisements objectifying women.  
In the case of Prakash Mani Sharma (2067), the Supreme Court issued 
another order of mandamus to the government to enact legislation guaranteeing a safe 
and healthy work environment for women employed in dance bars and massage 
parlors, and interim directives to regulate these businesses to protect women from 
sexual harassment.
65
 Then, in Mira Dhungana (2069), the Court struck down section 
15(6) of the Human Traffic and Transportation Act 2007, which criminalizes the non-
cooperation of human trafficking victims—mostly women—in proceedings against 
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the traffickers.
66
 This batch of cases illustrates the Supreme Court’s awareness of the 
importance of both women-friendly legal procedures and structures alongside 
contextual measures to guarantee women’s safety also by changing the way in which 
women are portrayed, for instance, in advertisements.  
 
3.4. Intersectional claims: immigration and citizenship 
Gender equality claims in the areas of immigration and citizenship law pertain to the 
fact that Nepali women have fewer legal rights than Nepali men in passing their 
entitlements to residency and citizenship to their children and foreign spouses. These 
claims are of an intersectional nature because a disproportionate number of Madhesi 
women in the Terai region are affected by these arrangements due to the frequency of 
cross-border marriages with Indian men in those areas. Significantly, this was also the 
reason for the inclusion of such discriminatory provisions in the 1990 Constitution 
and the relevant legislation.
67
 In these types of cases, the petitioners are often 
individuals directly affected by the legal regime, and the remedies sought usually 
combine an order of mandamus to obtain the necessary documents (citizenship 
documents or visas) with an ultra vires declaration of the impugned provision. It must 
be noted from the outset that while the Supreme Court has progressively adopted an 
interpretation of the right to equality aimed at securing equal rights for Nepali women 
in these areas of law, the “success” of the petitioners in Court has not been matched 
by executive and legislative compliance with the many court orders. A 2013 study 
conducted by the Forum for Women, Law and Development showed that as of July 
2011, 23.65 percent of Nepal’s total population age 16 or above (i.e. over 4.3 million 
people) lacked citizenship certificates.
68
 
With regard to immigration law, in the early case of Benjamin Peters, the 
Supreme Court dismissed on procedural grounds the petition asking the Court to 
strike down rule 14(3) of the Regulations Relating to Foreigners 1975 that provided 
for a shorter validity of spousal visa for the foreign husband of a Nepali woman than 
the foreign wife of a Nepali man.69 A year later the same legal issue presented itself to 
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the Supreme Court in the Mira Gurung case; the Court struck down the rule on the 
grounds that it discriminated against Nepali women married to a foreign man and 
ordered the government to make the necessary amendments to the legislation to 
secure gender equality in this area of law.
70
 Similarly, in the case of Punyawati 
Pathak the Supreme Court declared ultra vires the provision of the Nepal 
Immigration Act requiring the consent of the male guardian for a Nepali woman to 
acquire her passport.
71
 In Mira Dhungana (2068) instead, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the petition asking the Court to invalidate section 4 of Schedule 9 of the 
Immigration Rules prescribing higher visa fees for foreign husband than for foreign 
wives of Nepali citizens on the grounds that it was a matter of policy for the 
executive.
72
 
With regard to citizenship, the Supreme Court has decided a long string of 
cases pertaining to the gender-based discrimination in this area of law and 
consistently decided in favor of equal treatment between men and women. However, 
Nepal’s citizenship framework has yet to be revised to comply with the many 
Supreme Court’s orders and remains in breach of the country’s international legal 
obligation. This area of law represents the biggest failure of the women’s movement 
in Nepal, notwithstanding the numerous successes in litigation. This outcome can be 
explained only by the intersectional nature of these claims between the demands of 
non-national groups (women) and potentially national groups (Madhesis). In fact, 
inside the courtroom the claims have been treated purely as gender-based 
discrimination claims, but the litigation has never touched upon the political reasons 
behind the discriminatory nature of Nepal’s citizenship framework.  
The restrictions on Nepali women’s ability to pass on citizenship has been 
historically linked to the issue of Madhesi regionalism, which is complicated by the 
open border with India. These restrictions have been engineered with the idea of 
insulating the Nepali nation from India. The aim has been to reduce cross-border 
marriages and prevent Indian men marrying Nepali women and their offspring from 
acquiring Nepali citizenship.
73
 In fact, due to the sensitive political implications of the 
issue petitioners have not raised intersectional arguments in their pleadings. 
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Conversely, the Supreme Court never directed the government to reform the 
citizenship framework by using gender-neutral language. Politicians have long 
justified these discriminatory provisions on the basis of the notion of kanyādān–yet 
again constructing the identity of women and their legal rights on the basis of their 
familial relationship with men. 
The Chandra Kanta Gyawali case was an early unsuccessful attempt to 
challenge the discriminatory citizenship provisions under the Nepal Citizenship Act 
and Part 2 of the 1990 Constitution through which the matrilineal acquisition of 
Nepali citizenship can only lead to naturalized citizenship and not citizenship by 
descent.
74
 Instead, in the case of Achyut Kharel (2061), the Supreme Court secured 
citizenship rights to the children of Nepali women with an unknown father under the 
right to equality to prevent the issue of statelessness from arising.
75
 In Tek Tamrakar, 
the Supreme Court issued an order of mandamus ordering the government to register 
the births and provide citizenship documents to the children of single mothers in the 
Badi community—a dalit social group in mid-western Nepal frequently involved in 
sex trade.
76
 The Court held that the constitutional right to equality affords special 
protection to backward classes and ordered the government to improve the living 
conditions of this community, but it did not invalidate the provision of the Children 
Act 1991 requiring the naming of the father to register a child’s birth.  
In the post-2007 citizenship cases, the Supreme Court adopted a more activist 
stance with regard to women’s citizenship rights. In the case of Nakkali Maharjan, the 
Court ordered the Kirtipur Municipality to issue a citizenship recommendation letter 
to the petitioner without discriminating on the basis of gender and marital status.
77
 In 
Ranjit Thapa the Supreme Court held that an individual is entitled to choose whether 
to acquire citizenship via the residence address of the father or the mother.
78
 In the 
landmark Sabina Damai decision, the Court ordered the Dolakha District 
Administration Office to issue the citizenship documents to the petitioner on the basis 
of her mother’s Nepali citizenship regardless of the fact that the identity of the father 
was unknown, and the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue a circular to all district 
                                                        
74
 Chandra Kanta Gyawali v. Office of the Prime Minister, 2058, 43(11) NKP 615 (2001). 
75
 Achyut Kharel v. Office of the Prime Minister, 2062, 47(4) NKP 512 (2005). 
76
 Tek Tamrakar v. Government of Nepal, 2062, 47(6) NKP 680 (2005). 
77
 Nakkali Maharjan v. Office of the Prime Minister, 2065, 50(11) NKP 1340 (2008). 
78
 Ranjit Thapa v. Office of the Prime Minister, NKP 2066 (2009), Vol. 51, N. 6, p. 1014. 
 28 
administration offices to comply with the Court’s ruling.79 A string of cases ensued in 
which the Supreme Court issued order after order to the government to implement the 
Court’s decisions at executive level and introduce necessary legislative reforms,80 but 
the implementation of the decisions and the reform of the system continue to elude 
campaigners. In fact, the new 2015 constitution reintroduced a section on citizenship 
discriminating against women in passing their citizenship to their offspring. An 
amendment of these provisions using gender-neutral terms does not appear to be on 
the horizon, even if the Nepali government has been severely criticized in both 
domestic and international fora for the enduring gender-based discrimination in 
matters of citizenship, for instance, at the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review 
in November 2015. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis of Nepal’s gender equality litigation between 1990 and 2015 reveals the 
Supreme Court’s pivotal role as a public forum to engage issues of gender equality 
and define its meaning in constitutional terms. Thus, the Court has contributed 
enormously to the advancement of women’s rights by progressively chipping away at 
gender-based discriminatory laws, policies, and practices in an incremental fashion. A 
nuanced account of Nepal’s gender equality jurisprudence over twenty-five years 
illuminates key trends in this area—and the challenges and opportunities ahead for 
constitutional litigation on women’s rights. The article identifies two main ways in 
which the Supreme Court has advanced women’s rights in Nepal.  
First, with regard to the outcome of litigation narrowly understood as the 
verdict, Nepal’s Supreme Court has consistently found for the petitioners demanding 
gender equality since the beginning of constitutional litigation in this area. With 
regard to the justification offered by the Court in its decisions on gender equality, the 
picture is more complex. A clear shift can be identified from an earlier, more 
deferential and formalistic approach to women’s rights to a bolder, more assertive 
response to issues of gender-based discrimination. In the early case law, the Supreme 
Court adopted a formal understanding of gender equality and often provided 
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legalistic, conservative, and inward-looking forms of justification for its decisions. 
While the Court sought to ensure that Nepali women were protected and treated with 
a modicum of fairness, it resisted radical challenges to the status quo. Instead, in later 
case law, the Court veered toward a more substantive notion of gender equality at the 
intersection of recognition and redistributive justice. Judges started to justify their 
decisions in progressive terms by referring to international law and foreign precedents 
seeking to bring the legal treatment of Nepali women in line with global norms. 
Significantly, they also sought to reframe the position of Nepali women within the 
coordinates of national history and local culture in which gender relations are 
embedded, to avoid a sterile dichotomic opposition between autochthonous and 
“foreign” values.  
Second, the Supreme Court after 1990 sought to consolidate its institutional 
position while retaining a dialogue with the other branches of government and civil 
society. This is most evident in the type of remedies granted by the Court and the 
nature of its engagement with the executive and legislature. In earlier case law, the 
Supreme Court did not often exercise its power to invalidate primary legislation but 
ordered the government to revise the existing legal framework and introduce the 
necessary reforms. In case law decided after the crucial 2002 and 2006 amendments 
to the Muluki Ain, the Court became bolder and began to invalidate primary 
legislation in a number of cases. At the same time, the Court sought to continue its 
institutional dialogue with the other branches and not antagonize them. This approach 
has been fruitful as a number of legislative and policy reforms were actualized 
following decisions of the Supreme Court. Interestingly, the Court sought to maintain 
an open line of communication also with civil society by ordering the formation of 
expert commissions to report back to the Court itself and to the other branches of 
government, by relying on the briefs of an amicus curiae, and inviting oral testimonies 
of both expert witnesses and individuals affected. This led to a greater visibility of the 
Court, and a growing interest by civil society and the media in its work. As a result, 
Nepal’s Supreme Court succeeded in acting as a catalyst for debates on the meaning 
and remit of gender equality in the country.  
In this respect, an important factor external to the Supreme Court is crucial to 
explain the success and impact of constitutional litigation in advancing women’s 
rights in the context of Nepal: the nature of the petitioners in gender equality 
litigation. Activist lawyers working through NGOs initiated most of the cases 
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analyzed in this article—many in the form of abstract review of legislation. As such, 
these activist lawyers deployed a systematic, incrementalist strategy in litigation. 
Initially they sought to petition the Supreme Court to remove discriminatory legal 
provisions, issue directives to the government and the legislature with regard to 
introducing new protections, and declare a growing number of forms of gender-based 
discrimination unlawful. They aimed at building a solid body of pro-women case law, 
but litigation was only one element of a broader, concerted strategy. Their ultimate 
goal was a comprehensive gender-sensitive overhaul of Nepal’s legal system. This 
included lobbying the executive and legislative branches to introduce appropriate law 
and policy reforms and devising awareness campaigns alongside other development-
oriented activities. It is also because of this network of civil society organizations 
focused on “cause lawyering” that the impact of gender equality litigation in Nepal 
has been so tangible, comprehensive, and pervasive. 
Over the years Nepal’s Supreme Court has sought to impose a growing 
number of obligations on the executive and the legislature to secure a more level 
playing field for women. However, the multidimensional nature of gender as a form 
social classification explains the limitations of the successes of the Supreme Court in 
advancing women’s rights. A combination of discrimination on the basis of both class 
and identity (understood in intersectional terms) has limited the success of gender 
equality litigation with respect to access to justice, the outcome, and the impact of 
litigation. One of the areas where further improvement is needed remains access to 
justice. Poor women—and especially those from historically marginalized 
communities—have not succeeded in bringing their claims to Court due to a 
combined lack of material resources, cultural capital, and support structures.  
With regard to outcome, the issues of justification given by the Supreme Court 
and implementation of judicial decisions require further qualification. In 
intersectional claims combining gender-based grievances with those of potentially 
national groups (e.g. citizenship), the Supreme Court has sidestepped entirely the 
intersectional nature of the claim in justifying its decisions. Similarly, implementation 
of the many Court decisions on citizenship has been weak and ineffective. In cases 
involving the position of women within the family, the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to challenge the traditional construction of women’s identities as dependent 
on their familial relationship and offered very weak, legalistic forms of justification 
revolving around fairness of treatment rather than substantive equality, for instance, in 
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property rights cases. These claims have challenged traditional gender roles within the 
family and demanded forms of redistributive justice together with the removal of 
discriminatory barriers. The Supreme Court both in citizenship and property rights 
cases, stopped short of the most obvious solution, i.e. recommending the use of 
gender-neutral language when dealing with issues of gendered-based discrimination. 
Thus, these rights remain contingent upon women’s familial relationship to men. It is 
unsurprising that a report by leading anthropologist Lynn Bennett has identified the 
home—and the web of family relations that accompany it—as the key site of 
disempowerment for Nepali women.
81
 The notable exception is represented by the 
case law on reproductive rights, in which the Court successfully combined the trope 
of protecting women with empowerment. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on gender equality has played an 
important role in the construction of Nepal’s constitutional identity through 
progressive forms of justification, most obvious in cases about gender-based violence, 
reproductive rights, and gender equality in the workplace, and more conservative 
ones, notably in matters pertaining to the position of women within the family. By 
combining traditional autochthonous values and global norms, Nepal’s constitutional 
discourse on gender equality continues to shape what can be thought and said about 
women and their place in Nepali society. In particular, the Court has produced a 
discreet, context-specific classification of what constitutes unlawful discriminatory 
conduct and lawful inequalities that Nepali constitutionalism must reject or can 
tolerate. This process has broader political implications as it offers key insights into 
the way in which the Supreme Court imagines, construes, and shapes the identity of 
the Nepali polity—and its internal “hierarchies of belonging.” While embracing 
women’s autonomy and individual identity in growing areas of law, the Court shied 
away from challenging gendered roles within the family and the traditional social 
order that they underpin. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will continue to 
contribute to the recognition and empowerment of all Nepali women as equal citizens 
so that they will be able to exercise full participatory parity within the family and in 
society at large—regardless of their gender, class, and intersectional identities.  
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